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In a recent Letter [1] Barrett, Hardy and Kent (BHK) considered a very interesting 
question which of the fundamental laws of physics ensure security of quantum cryptographic 
protocols. In particular, they presented quantum key distribution protocol and claimed its 
security in a very general framework, which allows - what they call - postquantum 
eavesdropping strategies i.e. which "allows for eavesdroppers who can break the laws of 
quantum mechanics, as long as nothing they can do implies the possibility of superluminal 
signaling". In this Comment, however, we show that it is still possible to construct a strategy, 
which although consistent with all asumptions explicitely stated in [1], enables perfect 
eavesdropping in BHK protocol. 
In addition to no signaling condition (assumption A), BHK make only two further 
technical assumptions which restrict the possible action of Eve. Assumption B states that 
"measurements on a shared state cannot be used to send signals between the parties in any 
configuration" [1]. Finally, assumption C requires that "no information about events in Alice's 
and Bob's laboratories - in particular, their measurements or outcomes - subsequently 
propagates to Eve" [1]. The assumptions B and C mean that both Alice’s and Bob’s 
laboratories are secure against leaking information out. Note that none of these assumptions 
protect both laboratories against information flowing in the oposite direction.    
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Let us now present a scheme which shows that the assumptions A, B and C are not 
sufficient to ensure the security of the BHK protocol. Our attack concentrates on the second 
point of the BHK protocol. To choose measurement bases in a proper way, Alice and Bob 
have to use some sort of random number generator. It can be of classical or, better yet, of 
quantum nature. Let us now imagine that in a hypothetical postquantum world (far, far away) 
there exists Eve which has some capabilities of Jedi Masters [2]. Namely Eve is able to 
control results of random processes (e.g. quantum measurements). Let us also assume that the 
interaction between Eve and a given random number generator is mediated by some kind of 
postquantum field which propagates at a speed not exceeding the speed of light. Thus Eve 
cannot use her Force for superluminal signalling. Obviously, assumptions B and C hold as 
well. On the other hand, Eve can use Force to decide which measurements bases will be 
chosen by Alice and Bob. Having full control over the measurements bases Eve can also 
control the measurements results by sending to both Alice and Bob qubits in a 
deterministically prepared pure states corresponding to the bases chosen. In this way Eve 
knows perfectly the outcomes of all measurements without any information gained from 
Alice’s and Bob’ laboratories. Moreover, Eve can easily choose both measurements bases and 
their outcomes in such a way that they pass any desired correlation test (e.g. violation of some 
generalized Bell inequality).  
We believe, that the above scheme does not impair the main conclusion of the BHK 
paper about the fundamental position of no signaling condition in quantum cryptography. It 
shows, however, that the BHK protocol in its actual version, although secure against 
particular attack analyzed in the Letter [1], is not secure against  "general attacks by a 
postquantum eavesdropper limited only by the impossibility of superluminal signaling". 
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